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I want to focus my remarks this morningon the role of government in risk-bearing.A little over a decade ago, I addressed theissue of the role of government in risk-
bearing at a conference sponsored by the Federal
Reserve Bank of Cleveland (Stiglitz, 1993). I used
the market failure/government failure paradigm,
sketching out in particular limitations in markets
and government that led to a role for government
in this area. I identified
• important risks for which the market does
not provide adequate insurance, such as
inflation, floods, and crime;
• important risks for which individuals and
firms frequently choose not to buy insur-
ance, but which result in significant adverse
consequences for those individuals, leading
to government bailouts (and because govern-
ment cannot commit itself not to engage in
such bailouts, there is in fact an incentive
for individuals not to purchase adequate
insurance);
• important risks for which the market pro-
vides insurance, but inefficiently and/or
at a high cost (contributing, of course, to
individual’s not purchasing adequate insur-
ance); and
• intergenerational risks.
I explored, too, the reasons for these market
failures, including the problems arising out of
asymmetries of information (adverse selection
and moral hazard). By then, the theory of asym-
metric information had already developed to the
point where it helped explain why insurance
markets often do not function well. Private insur-
ance firms may spend an inordinate amount of
resources in attempting to identify low-risk indi-
viduals—essentially dissipative expenditures
intending to limit the extent of redistribution.
Michael Rothschild and I had shown how these
attempts to screen also limited the extent of insur-
ance that might be provided in the market. Our
later work (Rothschild and Stiglitz, 1997)
explained how the availability of better informa-
tion might actually impede the ability of insurance
markets to provide coverage for important risks.
I want to briefly explore what has happened
since then to our understanding of the role of
government in risk-bearing, focusing on particular
episodes and events.
1. We have learned that the problems of
accounting in insurance are even more
difficult than we had thought, making it
more difficult to ascertain whether a private
insurance firm is, or is not, solvent. The
ability of so many firms in the United States
to manipulate their books (most recently
in the case of AIG)—even when it has not
resulted in bankruptcy—has highlighted
the problems of accounting. These problems
played into the government bailouts (and
impending bailouts) of private pension (and
possibly retirement health insurance) pro-
grams. (But more was at play there—the
politics of wealth transfer, discussed below.)
2. It means, of course, that individuals have
enormous difficulties in assessing whether
they do or do not have coverage for impor-
tant risks—the firms from which they have
bought insurance may not be able to deliver
when needed. This was key to understand-
ing some of the problems in East Asia,
where many Korean firms thought that they
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had purchased protection against exchange
rate risk, but the insurance was not there
when the insured-against event occurred.1
3. Natural disasters, such as Hurricane Katrina
and, in earlier years, hurricanes in Florida
and floods along the Mississippi, have made
two things clear: Large numbers of individ-
uals facing large risks have not purchased
insurance (for one reason or another); and,
when disasters happen, there will be a
government bailout. (The recognition of
this, in turn, provides one of the reasons
individuals limit the purchase of insurance;
that is, if it is left as a voluntary matter.)
There is clearly a role for government ex
ante, but ascertaining what that role should
be (requiring the provision of private insur-
ance, providing public insurance, etc.) is
not so simple. Determining appropriate
actuarial odds for small-probability events
is, in any case, difficult, and there is always
a worry about private insurance companies
exploiting consumers, especially when the
insurance is made mandatory. But if the
private sector has strong incentives to over-
charge, the public sector has strong incen-
tives to undercharge. Finding the right
balance is not going to be easy. Private insur-
ance companies have some advantage in
providing insurance for fires—in particular
in providing “regulations” concerning
sprinklers, which if imposed by the govern-
ment would be viewed as bureaucratic
intrusion. They may perform this role in
flood and hurricane insurance; in addition,
they may have an easier time charging
higher premia for properties that are more
at risk. 
4. By the same token, East Asia taught us
that when large numbers of individuals
and firms fail to buy adequate coverage, it
can have macroeconomic consequences.
The government may be forced to bail out
firms, or intervene to stabilize the
exchange rate (a kind of indirect bailout),
at great cost to others. The failure of large
numbers of individuals to purchase insur-
ance has externalities, which is a concern
that provides a rationale for government
intervention. The failure to buy insurance
may be partly related to high transactions
costs (see point 5), but also to individual
irrationality, the importance of which has
been stressed in recent research (for
example, the difficulties individuals have
in assessing small risks). This research has
called into question the conventional par-
adigm based on rationality. Governments
may want to take “preventive” actions
when adverse consequences result from
large numbers of individuals failing to act
in ways consistent with rationality, espe-
cially when those consequences lead to
perceived needs for collective action.
(Government currently subsidizes insur-
ance considerably through preferential tax
treatment. But these subsidies often distort
the market and are hardly directed at cor-
recting the market failures.) 
Three lessons emerge:
i. the importance of restrictions on
exposure, both by banks and financial
institutions;
ii. the importance of anti-trust policies in
reducing the number of firms that fall
into the “too big to fail” category; and
iii. the importance of governments paying
attention to the impact of various poli-
cies (such as capital market liberaliza-
tion) on national exposure to risk and
the ability of governments to respond
to those risks.
5. I had written earlier about transactions
costs as a rationale for government provi-
sion, but in some cases the size of transac-
tions costs have turned out to be truly
enormous. One study of the partial privati-
zation of the provision of pensions (annu-
ities) in the United Kingdom showed that
benefits were reduced by 40 percent as a
result of transactions costs. These costs are,
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1 The problems are exacerbated by the importance of hard-to-
estimate correlations among the risks.  Some of the standard
methods used by regulators to assess financial soundness ignored
these correlations.
of course, related in part to consumer irra-
tionality, e.g., the gullibility of individuals
to promises (or at least prospects) of higher
returns gives rise to “churning.” While regu-
lators know how to (imperfectly) insure
viability of insurance companies, regulating
practices that exploit consumer ignorance
is far more difficult. 
6. Meanwhile, the market by itself has shown
little improvement in its ability to provide
insurance against many of the potentially
long-run risks that individuals care about,
such as annuities that protect against infla-
tion, though in some cases there have been
some steps in the right direction by the
government. (Providing inflation-protected
securities was one of the important initia-
tives of the Council of Economic Advisers
during the Clinton administration.) 
7. The difficulties that national insurance and
global reinsurance companies faced in the
wake of the natural disasters of 1993-94
raised the problem of the ability of private
markets to handle large losses. The Council
of Economic Advisers in the Clinton admin-
istration, in an attempt to avoid the moral
hazard associated with solutions proposed
by the insurance industry (a variety of forms
of bailouts),  proposed creating a kind of
government-sponsored Arrow-Debreu secu-
rities market for these catastrophic losses.
Though there was some political support
for this idea, many in the industry wanted
a more outright subsidy. 
8. The political economy of insurance has
turned out to be one of the more interesting
developments. At one time, it became
recognized that providing underpriced
insurance to individuals and firms was a
good way of providing hidden subsidies,
with costs borne by future governments.
Subsequently, there was an attempt, through
the Credit Reform Act, to have the govern-
ment provide current actuarial estimates
of losses and hidden subsidies. Although
this was an important step forward, it has
clearly not been executed as thoroughly as
one would have wanted. In the case of the
Employee Retirement Income Security Act,
regulations have left pension funds with
large holes that the government will have
to fill. 
The same issue arises in the recent
debate about Social Security reform.
Clearly, some of the proposed reforms will,
in not implausible circumstances, leave
large numbers of individuals with what will
be clearly viewed as insufficient levels of
income. As it is highly likely that society
will not tolerate large numbers of the elderly
living in poverty, there will necessarily be
a government bailout. Thus, though the
reforms are being promoted as a way of
avoiding a bailout of Social Security using
general revenues, they are clearly only
changing the form of the bailout—from that
of the Social Security program to one that
will bail out individuals. This is, of course,
one of the difficult issues arising in the
analysis of “implicit” liabilities. The govern-
ment has an implicit obligation to provide
Social Security benefits roughly commen-
surate with those promised, though clearly
there can and will be adjustments. The
government also has an implicit obligation
to make sure that large numbers of its citi-
zens are not living in poverty, though the
nature of this obligation may be harder to
quantify. 
(The current reforms also raise questions
about intergenerational social contracts and,
more broadly, what may be viewed either
as intergenerational insurance or intergen-
erational social solidarity. The current social
insurance system is designed, in effect, to
allow some smoothing of incomes across
generations, of a kind consistent with what
individuals might have wanted could they
purchase such insurance behind a veil of
ignorance [not knowing the generation into
which they would be born]. The so-called
progressive indexation reform would
greatly undermine this kind of social
insurance.)
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The debate over Social Security reform
again illustrates the difficulties of risk
assessment. The financial soundness of
the Social Security system depends on
75-year projections of variables such as life
expectancy, birthrates, migration, retire-
ment ages, and wage and productivity
increases. Under some scenarios, the Social
Security system is solvent; under others,
it faces significant problems. The adminis-
tration has chosen to emphasize those
scenarios which are adverse—though in
its advocacy of other reforms (such as tax
cuts) it has used scenarios which, were they
used to assess the solvency of the Social
Security system, would make it appear to
be in far better shape.
9. Nowhere are the inadequacies of the current
system of providing insurance more evident
than in the case of health insurance, where,
as a result of preferential tax treatments, we
have over-insurance on the part of some,
while nearly 50 million Americans have
no insurance against one of the most impor-
tant risks they face. This system has resulted
in huge inequities and inefficiencies in the
provision of care (including preventive
care) and treatment. Some of the proposed
(and recently instituted) reforms probably
result in increased distortions, associated
with cream skimming (self-selection out of
the insurance pool), that in turn will lead
to higher prices for those remaining in the
insurance pool, which will thus cause some
to drop out and increase the number of
those without insurance. The appropriate
response to this problem clearly would take
me beyond this short discussion. Suffice
it to say that any successful reform will
require a more thorough analysis of the
areas in which moral-hazard problems
really arise and a more extensive public
discussion of attitudes toward separating
equilibria (cross-subsidization of the sick
by the healthy). There are huge explicit and
hidden government expenditures, and it
would seem that these expenditures could
be spent in ways that were more conducive
to efficiency and more consistent with basic
principles of equity.  
This review of the role of government in the
provision of insurance has been necessarily
sketchy. There are many lessons to be drawn from
these experiences.  
• There is not just a single moral-hazard
problem but several, often interrelated,
moral-hazard problems. Reducing one set
of problems may increase another. Care
needs to be exercised in determining the
design of government intervention. This is
illustrated by the controversy over deposit
insurance. Deposit insurance, it has been
argued, leads to an increase in the moral
hazard of individuals taking insufficient
care in assessing banks’ risk-taking behavior
and a consequent moral-hazard problem of
banks undertaking excessive risk-taking.
But government cannot commit not to inter-
vene, so that even without formal deposit
insurance, there may be implicit insurance,
with similar consequences. On the other
hand, it is virtually impossible for deposi-
tors to monitor bank behavior effectively;
and such monitoring is a public good. It
should accordingly be provided by govern-
ment. The most effective and efficient way
of controlling the moral hazard may be a
combination of incentives (ensuring that
the owners of the bank have enough at risk
not to undertake excessive risk taking) and
controls (both of the nature of lending and
of conflicts of interest that give risk to
problematic lending.)2
• Government policies play a central role in
affecting many of the key risks facing market
participants. Capital market liberalization
exposes countries to new risks; automatic
stabilizers reduce economic volatility. With
government as an actor within the economy,
this suggests the need to confront govern-
ment with appropriate incentives to miti-
2 The general principles of  “robust regulation” are set forth in
Stiglitz (2001).
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gate these risks. For instance, indexing (say,
government interest payments) increases
the government’s cost of failing to keep
inflation under control. There are, however,
two counterarguments. The first results
from the presence of multilayered agency
problems. Government is affected by voter
responses. Increasing voters’ cost of infla-
tion may provide greater incentives for
government to control inflation than the
direct budgetary costs of indexation. This
is related to the second problem: Govern-
ment is not a single “actor.” Governments
today may try to pass on costs to future
governments. What matters are incentives
facing current governments, and designing
appropriate incentives may not be easy. 
• Underlying many of the problems we have
identified are difficulties in assessing risk—
and systematic biases in individual risk
assessments.  Research in behavioral eco-
nomics in recent years has emphasized
systematic problems in risk assessment,
especially associated with small-probability
events. But even if individuals are fully
rational and are able to take into account
complex correlations using sophisticated
Bayesian analysis, there simply may not
be sufficient data to make an adequate risk
assessment with much confidence. Global
warming is proceeding at a pace far faster
than even most climate scientists expected.
We still do not know the impact on weather
variability, and this is what is relevant in
assessing actuarially fair insurance premia
for damage due to hurricanes or floods.
Government may be in a better position to
provide risk assessments than ordinary
citizens; but standard political economy
analyses suggest that government itself may
be tempted to exploit voter misperceptions,
just as insurance companies are.
Most importantly, we have repeatedly seen
government bailouts—the provision of insurance
ex post. The current system of providing such ex
post insurance is inefficient and inequitable. There
has to be a better way. To find that better way
requires understanding why individuals have
been inadequately insured, which further requires
a deeper understanding of both the market and
public failures in risk markets. I hope this dis-
cussion has provided some illumination into a
number of these recent failures.
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